From a Platform for the Revolution to Evidence for the Prosecution

From a Platform for the Revolution to Evidence for the Prosecution

How Did Facebook in Tunisia Change from a Tool for Breaking the Media Blackout into a Space Where a Post Can Lead to an Investigation?

Prepared by: Mohamed Dhaoui | August 2026

In this article

Before a Tunisian presses the “Publish” button, he no longer asks only: is what I wrote true? And will people engage with it? A harsher question has been added to these: could this post lead me to an investigation?

This question does not appear in Facebook’s interface, but it is present in the minds of users who know that a post, a share, or a statement that gets reposted can leave the phone screen and enter a police report or a court file. This does not mean that every post leads to prosecution, but it does mean that the possibility of being tracked has become part of the calculations about expression for groups of journalists, activists, and citizens.

Here lies the paradox: the platform that in 2011 helped carry images of the protests and break part of the media blackout is no longer merely a tool for reaching information. In documented cases, a post, a share, or a piece of satire has become material for summons, legal characterization, and trial. Facebook itself has not turned into a court; what has changed is what can happen to the author of words after those words reach others.

For that reason, this article does not ask only a historical question about Facebook’s role in the revolution. It traces a deeper reversal: how did censorship move from trying to stop content from reaching its audience to holding its author to account after it arrives? And how did a quieter, stricter form of censorship emerge between the two periods, in which users delete their own opinion before anyone sees it?

1. The Post That Was Never Written

Cases, summonses, and rulings can be counted, but there is a number that appears in no report: how many people wrote a post, read it a second time, and then deleted it before pressing “Publish”? This small act is the least visible face of self-censorship; it needs no blocking decision and leaves behind no file that can be counted.

The report by the association Taqatu’ on Decree-Law 54 raises the possibility that prosecutions and penalties push the journalist, the activist, or the citizen to hesitate in addressing public affairs. The deletion of a single post does not prove the existence of systematic censorship, but the repetition of fear of consequences changes the function of the platform: instead of being a place for saying what the user thinks, it becomes a place for testing whether saying it is safe.

Here silence does not begin with a direct external prohibition; it begins with an inner question: “Is this opinion worth what may follow from it?” When this question becomes part of everyday writing, freedom of expression is no longer tied only to the ability to open an account, but to the feeling of safety in using it.

Sources for this section
  • Taqatu’ Association, “Decree-Law No. 54: The Authorities’ Pretext for Jailing Their Opponents,” especially the methodology and the analysis of the chilling effect.
  • National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists, annual report on the state of press freedoms, 2025.
An empty chair with a face-down phone and crumpled paper: the posts that were never written

2. The Same Platform… but the Danger Has Changed

In the winter of 2010 to 2011, the main danger was that the image would be blocked before it arrived. When the protests broke out in Sidi Bouzid, social networks filled part of the void left by traditional media. Citizens filmed what was happening with phones and cameras, and the material then moved from one page to another and from one city to another, and on to media outlets outside the country.

Facebook did not make the revolution; it was made by social, economic, and political causes and by people who went out into the streets. But it helped speed up the circulation of information, increase the visibility of the protests, and link distant events. An academic study published in 2012 supports this understanding: the participants in its survey saw the platform as having political, informational, and media roles.

The user at that time asked: how do I make others see what is happening? Today a different question has been added: what can happen to me after others see it?

The platform is nearly the same, but the center of danger has moved from access to consequence.

Sources for this section
  • Reporters Without Borders, Tunisia – The role of the social networks in covering #sidibouzid, 2011.
  • Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012 – Tunisia.
  • Marzouki et al., The Contribution of Facebook to the 2011 Tunisian Revolution, 2012.
A crowd raising phones and cameras toward the sky: 2010–2011

3. From Blocking the Page to Prosecuting Its Owner

According to Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders, more than a hundred Facebook pages linked to the events were blocked during the protests. The direct aim of the technical censorship was to disable access to content or to control its path. After 14 January 2011, the system of broad blocking declined sharply, and the 2014 Constitution then enshrined freedom of opinion, thought, expression, media, and publication.

But the political and legal environment changed again after 25 July 2021, followed by Presidential Order No. 117 and the 2022 Constitution. In September 2022, Decree-Law No. 54 on combating offenses relating to information and communication systems was issued, and its Article 24 became one of the texts most present in the debate on digital expression.

The shift here is not from total censorship to total freedom or the reverse; it is from one tool to another. In the first period, blocking stopped the page from arriving. In the later period, the post may reach the public, and then a dispute begins over its author, his intent, its content, and the law that applies to it.

From Blocking the Page to Prosecuting Its Owner

How the tool of censorship changed between 2010 and 2026

I
2010–2011

More than 100 pages
linked to the protests blocked

II
2014

The Constitution enshrines
freedom of expression

III
2021–2022

Order 117, the 2022 Constitution
and Decree-Law 54

IV
2024–2026

Summonses, prosecutions
and rulings over posts

From stopping content from arriving… to holding its author to account after it arrives
Figure 1: Censorship moved from a technical tool to a legal one.
Sources for this section
  • Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012 – Tunisia: blocking and the transformation after January 2011.
  • Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia of 2014, especially Articles 31 and 49.
  • Presidential Order No. 117 of 2021, the 2022 Constitution, and Decree-Law No. 54 of 2022.
A wall of blank screens and a desk with a file: from blocking to prosecution

4. When Does a Post Become a Court File?

Decree-Law 54 carries a declared aim that is legitimate in principle: combating offenses relating to information and communication systems, such as hacking, fraud, and attacks on data. Its Article 2 provides that the public authorities, when applying it, are bound by the constitutional guarantees, by the ratified treaties, and by national legislation in the fields of human rights, freedoms, and the protection of personal data.

But Article 24 widened the controversy to content. It punishes with five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 dinars anyone who intentionally uses information and communication systems to produce, circulate, publish, send, or prepare false news, data, rumors, or documents that are forged or falsely attributed to others, with the intent to infringe the rights of others, harm public security or national defense, or spread terror among the population.

Article 24 remains open to criticism even after the 2026 amendment: we do not welcome this amendment or regard it as a sufficient reform. The amendment did not remove the forms of criminalization. In the first paragraph it kept the acts of producing, publishing, or sending false or fabricated news, data, rumors, or documents, or ones falsely attributed to others, when they aim to harm the rights of others, public security, or national defense, or to spread terror among the population. In the second paragraph it kept the criminalization of publishing or circulating personal data or falsely attributed matters with the intent to defame, damage reputation, cause material or moral harm, incite assault, or encourage hate speech; this paragraph already existed in the 2022 text and is not an addition made by the amendment.

As for the essential change in the penalty, the original text provided for five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 dinars, whereas the amendment made the principal penalty a fine of 10,000 to 20,000 dinars. But it added, in cases of repeat offenses, six months’ imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 dinars, kept the doubling of penalties when the target is a public official or equivalent, and provided that Article 53 of the Penal Code does not apply in cases of repeat offenses. For this reason we criticize the amendment sharply: it kept the broad forms of criminalization, kept a high fine, and brought back imprisonment for repeat offenses, while excluding Article 53 in that case.

Article 24: What Did the 2026 Amendment Change… and What Did It Keep?

Penalties before and after the amendment

I

The 2022 text

5 years’ imprisonment and a 50,000-dinar fine

II

The 2026 amendment

Principal penalty: a fine of 10,000 to 20,000 dinars

III

Repeat offenses

6 months’ imprisonment and a 50,000-dinar fine, without Article 53

IV

Public officials

Penalties doubled when the target is a public official or equivalent

V

The broad forms of criminalization… remain

Both paragraphs kept the same criminalized acts

Sept. 2022: decree-law issued
Feb. 2025: Cassation ruling
2026: the amendment
Figure 2: Penalties under Article 24 of Decree-Law 54 before and after the 2026 amendment.

It prescribes the same penalty for using the systems to publish information or attribute untrue matters with the intent to defame, damage reputation, cause material or moral harm, incite assault, or spread hate speech. The penalty is doubled if the targeted person is a public official or equivalent.

In theory, a mere error or an opinion alone is not enough; the text speaks of intent, purpose, and aim. But the dispute begins at proof and interpretation: is the content a claim of fact or an opinion? Is sharing an endorsement of the content? How is satire to be read? And what is the evidence of intent to harm? Here the “Publish” button turns from a simple technical act into a complex legal question.

Sources for this section
  • Official text of Decree-Law No. 54 of 2022, especially Articles 2 and 24.
  • Taqatu’ Association, “Decree-Law No. 54: The Authorities’ Pretext for Jailing Their Opponents,” analysis of Article 24.
  • Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2023 – Tunisia.
A giant smartphone with case files spilling out and a gavel at its base

5. A “Share” That May Go Beyond the Phone Screen

On 10 May 2024, Mohamed Walid Zaidi went to the police station in Hajeb El Ayoun to obtain a national identity card. According to a report by the Observatory of Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, he was informed that he was the subject of a search, and the investigation of him was then tied to his sharing of a post from a media site that conveyed a political position on economic conditions, a call to protest, and a call to boycott the 2022 elections. The report indicates that a detention order was issued against him the following day.

The importance of the case is that it concerns not only content the user wrote himself but the act of “sharing.” It raises a question that no single button answers: is reposting full agreement with the content? When is the user a carrier, and when is he treated as a publisher? No general rule can be drawn from one case, but the incident shows that every user has become a link in the chain of publication, with potential responsibility.

Sources for this section
  • Observatory of Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, May 2024 report: the case of Mohamed Walid Zaidi.
People on pedestals passing a single sheet of paper: every user is a link in the chain

6. When the Microphone Comes Back as a Post

The May 2024 report also documents the prosecution of the journalist Mourad Zeghidi. According to the document, the questions put to him covered political and social analyses he gave on a radio program, along with a post he published on his social media account. A statement that begins in front of a microphone can become a clip, then a post, then material that is legally reassessed outside the moment of the original broadcast.

There are no longer clear boundaries between traditional media and the platform. The journalist speaks on the radio, the user clips his words and publishes them, the post becomes news, and the news returns to Facebook. This merging has given speech greater power to spread, but it has also widened the number of contexts in which its author may be held to account.

Sources for this section
  • Observatory of Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, May 2024 report: the case of Mourad Zeghidi.
A radio microphone whose cable turns into a paper ribbon ending in files

7. Even Satire May Enter the File

In the same report, the Observatory records a case linked to the trade unionist Abdelkader Mansour, noting a complaint under Decree-Law 54 that was, according to it, tied to a satirical post he published on his page. Here the question becomes more precise: is satire read the way news is read? And where do exaggeration and mockery end and a claim that can be subjected to criminalization begin?

Political satire relies on context, suggestion, and exaggeration, not on the literal reporting of facts. For that reason, stripping a phrase from its context can change its meaning, and calling it satire does not grant it automatic immunity. The challenge is to distinguish between harsh criticism and an actual attack on the rights of others according to clear and foreseeable rules.

Sources for this section
  • Observatory of Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, May 2024 report: the case of Abdelkader Mansour.
A magnifying glass over a comedy mask: how is satire read?

8. Ten Cases in a Month… but What Does the Number Mean?

The Observatory of Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression announced that during May 2024 it monitored ten cases that it classified as violations of freedom of opinion and expression, involving journalists, media workers, bloggers, and two members of parliament. It says that most of the cases it followed during the month were referred under Article 24, on the basis of media statements or posts linked to political and social issues.

But the number needs its limits stated: it is the product of human rights monitoring over one month, not an official count of all expression cases in Tunisia. Also, describing the cases as “violations” is the assessment of the monitoring body. Even so, its significance lies in the repeated link between digital content and judicial proceedings within a short sample in time.

Sources for this section
  • Observatory of Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, “Summary of Violations of Freedom of Opinion in May 2024,” pp. 3 to 7.

9. 2025: The Judiciary Sets Limits on Expansion

On 3 February 2025, the Court of Cassation issued its criminal decision No. 74848 in the case of the journalist and commentator Sonia Dahmani, quashing the decision of the indictment chamber and sending the file back, particularly with regard to the application of Article 24. According to the analysis published in the annual report of the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists, the court affirmed that freedoms are the rule and restrictions are the exception, and that interpretation of a penal text should not widen the scope of criminalization.

The court held, according to the report, that a journalist’s opinions on public affairs through radio or television do not automatically fall within the scope of Decree-Law 54, and that Decree-Law No. 115 on freedom of the press, printing, and publishing may be the appropriate legal framework where necessary. This decision does not remove the existing risks, but it shows that the application of the text is not a single direction without judicial limits.

In the period from 1 April 2024 to 1 April 2025, the Syndicate recorded 32 prosecutions of journalists outside the framework that regulates the profession, 14 of them under Decree-Law 54, along with ten custodial sentences, only one of them suspended. These are union monitoring figures, not an official count of all cases.

What Do the Numbers Say?

Human rights and union monitoring figures, not official statistics

I

10 cases in one month

Monitored by the Observatory of Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression in May 2024

II

32 prosecutions of journalists

Outside the framework regulating the profession, April 2024 to April 2025

III

14 of them under Decree-Law 54

According to the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists

IV

10 custodial sentences

Only one of them suspended

V

Cassation decision No. 74848

“Freedoms are the rule and restrictions are the exception,” per the Syndicate’s analysis

May 2024: 10 cases
Feb. 2025: Cassation sets limits
July 2026: 3 new rulings
Figure 3: Key monitoring figures from 2024 to 2026, as reported by the Observatory, the Syndicate, and Reporters Without Borders.
Sources for this section
  • National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists, annual report on the state of press freedoms, 3 May 2025, pp. 25 to 29.

10. 2026: Decree-Law 54 Is Not the Only Tool

In July 2026, Reporters Without Borders documented three rulings connected to journalistic work and to public posts or statements. On 15 July, the Court of Appeal in Sfax sentenced the journalist Haythem El Mekki to one year in prison over a post in which he criticized documented failings at the Habib Bourguiba Hospital. The prosecution began under Decree-Law 54, and the ruling was then issued on the basis of Article 86 of the Telecommunications Code.

Before that, on 26 June, a one-year prison sentence was upheld against the journalist Zied El Heni for criticizing judicial decisions during an academic seminar and then relaying the position in a Facebook post. The organization also reported that the journalist Khaoula Boukrim was sentenced in absentia to four years in two cases under Decree-Law 54.

These cases show, according to their sources, that the debate is no longer about Decree-Law 54 alone. The same content may move between the Telecommunications Code, the penal texts, and other laws. This widens the area of uncertainty: the question is not only what Decree-Law 54 says, but which text may be invoked when a post turns into a dispute.

Sources for this section
  • Reporters Without Borders, the rulings of Haythem El Mekki, Zied El Heni, and Khaoula Boukrim, 17 July 2026.
  • Committee to Protect Journalists, Beyond Decree 54, 12 May 2026.
A scale, a law book and a gavel on green pedestals

The Danger That Changed

Dimension2010–20112022–2026
Facebook’s functionCarrying images of the protests and breaking the blackoutA space for criticism, accountability, and resharing
Most prominent tool of controlBlocking, hacking, and technical surveillanceLegal prosecution, penalties, and administrative pressure
Danger to the userDisabled access and stolen accountsSummons, prosecution, prison, and self-censorship
Prevailing behaviorFilming and rapid publishingCaution, deletion, and rewording, or continuing to express oneself despite the risk
Central questionHow does the information get out?What can happen after it gets out?
Sources for this section
  • A comparative reading based on reports by Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House, and the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists; their full details appear in the references.

11. Freedom Does Not Mean the Absence of Responsibility

Freedom of expression does not mean that threats, incitement to violence, or attacks on private life or the rights of others become permissible. The digital space needs legal protection, and victims need effective means of redress. But the severity of the penalty requires, in turn, a high level of clarity, precision, and proportionality.

The dividing line is not between “freedom without rules” and “law without freedom.” The question is whether the rule allows the user to foresee the consequence of his act, and whether its application distinguishes between news, opinion, satire, and journalistic work, and between an unintentional error and a deliberate act aimed at causing harm.

The importance of this balance grows when Article 24 doubles the penalty if the target is a public official or equivalent, because public figures and institutions are by nature subjects of criticism and accountability. Protecting reputation and rights is legitimate, but criticism related to public affairs also needs a space that does not empty it of its meaning.

Sources for this section
  • Decree-Law No. 54 of 2022, especially Articles 2 and 24.
  • Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia of 2022, especially Articles 37 and 55.

Conclusion: The Question Is No Longer “Can I Publish?”

Since 2011, it is not only the platform that has changed; the meaning of pressing the “Publish” button has changed. The user was trying to get across an image that the authorities had blocked, and then the digital space became an ordinary part of political and social debate. Today content may arrive easily, but its author does not always know clearly what path may begin after it arrives.

The deeper problem lies not only in the posts that ended up as cases, but in the posts that were never written, the questions that were never asked, and the criticism that was reworded until it lost its meaning. Technical censorship stops you from reaching the public, while self-censorship makes you give up reaching it before anyone tries to stop you.

For this reason the real question is no longer: can a Tunisian open a Facebook account? It is: can he use it to criticize, question, and hold to account without unexpected legal limits becoming a reason for silence? Between protecting others and protecting the right to speak, there is a space that fear cannot fill; it must be filled by clear rules, an independent judiciary, and proportionate application.

In 2011 the challenge was for the word to get out. In 2026 the challenge is also that its arrival does not become a penalty its author could not have foreseen. This is precisely where freedom of expression is tested: not in the existence of a “Publish” button, but in the ability to press it without unjustified fear.

A person holding up a phone as white paper birds fly out of it

Methodological Note

This article relies on original legal texts, human rights and union reports, an academic study, and published institutional sources, with the material updated through July 2026. Where a description such as “violation,” “legal prosecution,” or “chilling effect” appears, it is attributed to the body that used it; judicial facts are presented according to the sources cited. This material does not constitute legal advice.

— Core References

  1. Reporters Without Borders, Tunisia – The role of the social networks in covering #sidibouzid, 2011.
  2. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012 – Tunisia.
  3. Marzouki, Y. et al., The Contribution of Facebook to the 2011 Tunisian Revolution, 2012.
  4. Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia of 27 January 2014.
  5. Presidential Order No. 117 of 2021 of 22 September 2021 on exceptional measures.
  6. Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia of 25 July 2022, promulgated by Presidential Order No. 691 of 2022.
  7. Decree-Law No. 54 of 2022 of 13 September 2022 on combating offenses relating to information and communication systems.
  8. Taqatu’ Association, “Decree-Law No. 54: The Authorities’ Pretext for Jailing Their Opponents,” April 2023.
  9. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2023 – Tunisia.
  10. Observatory of Violations of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, “Summary of Violations of Freedom of Opinion in May 2024.”
  11. National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists, annual report on the state of press freedoms in Tunisia, 3 May 2025.
  12. Committee to Protect Journalists, Beyond Decree 54: Tunisia’s latest measures to silence the press, 12 May 2026.
  13. Reporters Without Borders, The convictions of Haythem El Mekki, Zied El Heni and Khaoula Boukrim…, 17 July 2026.

Key Takeaways

A new question before “Publish”

Users no longer ask only whether what they wrote is true, but also: could this post lead me to an investigation?

The post that was never written

The least visible face of self-censorship is a post deleted before it is published: no blocking decision, no file to count.

From access to consequence

In 2011 more than 100 pages were blocked so the image would not arrive. Today the post may arrive, and then the dispute over its author begins.

Article 24 after the amendment

The 2026 amendment reduced the principal penalty to a fine, but kept the broad forms of criminalization and brought back prison for repeat offenses.

A share, a microphone, satire

A May 2024 report documented proceedings over a shared post, radio analyses, and a satirical post.

The courts set limits

In February 2025 the Court of Cassation affirmed that freedoms are the rule and that penal texts should not be read to widen criminalization.

Decree-Law 54 is not alone

The July 2026 rulings showed that the same content can be tried under other texts, such as Article 86 of the Telecommunications Code.

Clear rules, not fear

Between protecting others and protecting the right to speak, the space must be filled by clear rules, an independent judiciary, and proportionate application.